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Under the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct and state codes
of professional responsibility, there exists a conflict between the lawyers'
duty of confidentiality to their clients and the lawyers' duty to disclose an
ongoing fraud or other crime. That conflict raises a number of critical
ethical issues for the securities practitioner as well as the bar in general.
Under what circumstances does a lawyer have the obligation, or at least the
discretion, to disregard the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confi-
dentiality owed to a client when the lawyer knows that the client is engaged
in the commission of a fraud? May the lawyer continue the engagement on
behalf of the client or must he or. she resign? If the lawyer resigns, must
he or she remain silent and observe the continuing commission of a crime,
or does the lawyer have a duty, or at least the right, to warn the intended
victim and to assist in preventing or rectifying the injury?
These questions have been hotly debated within the legal profession in
general and within the securities bar in particular for a number of years.
They have been raised in enforcement actions instituted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC),' as well as in private actions under the
federal securities laws. 2 They are now being raised again in no uncertain
terms by the Office of Thrift Supervision which has arisen from the ashes
of the savings and loan debacle with the mission of recouping as much of
* Partner, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Washington, D.C. The author wishes to acknowl-
edge the valuable assistance of Kimberly Rose Green in the preparation of this article.
1. See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); Marc
I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1 CoLum. Bus. L. REv. 1, 1 (1991).
2. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
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the losses from failed institutions as possible.' This agency has sought to
fulfill its mission by making claims against the legal and accounting firms
that served the insolvent institutions-claims that often are predicated on
novel concepts of a lawyer's duty.
4
II. ABA MODEL RULE 1.6 AND FiNA.ci.L FRAUDs
Lawyers frequently find themselves struggling with the conflict between
their duty to keep client confidences and their duty to avoid participation
in a fraud. For the securities lawyer that conflict may become particularly
severe when the lawyer learns that the disclosures disseminated by a publicly
held client are materially false and misleading. For example, suppose that
in a merger of a publicly held company the lawyers for the company that
is being acquired learn prior to closing that the shareholders have approved
the merger on the basis of financial statements showing substantial earnings
when in fact the company had substantial losses. Under what circumstances
can the firm continue to represent the client in connection with the merger?
Does the firm have any obligation to disclose the facts to the acquiring
company and its shareholders who approved the merger on the basis of
materially false and misleading financial statements?
A threshold issue may well be what law of professional responsibility
applies. This question, like all choice-of-law issues, may be complicated by
the complexity of many modern legal transactions. The deal may have been
negotiated in West Virginia with the closing scheduled to take place in
Virginia. The parties may be incorporated under the laws of Maryland and
Delaware and have their principal places of business in New York and New
Jersey. The law firm may be a District of Columbia firm with offices in
five jurisdictions, and the individual lawyers may be members of the bar
in various jurisdictions.
Under these circumstances, the quickest way to get a handle on the
issue might well be with the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules). These rules have been adopted in some form or another by
38 jurisdictions, albeit with substantial variations among them.-
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules governs the confidentiality of client
information. 6 The rule states that a lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client without the client's authorization,
except when a lawyer reasonably believes that it is necessary to prevent a
client from committing a criminal action likely to result in death or sub-
stantial bodily harm, or to establish a claim or defense in a suit involving
the lawyer which arises out of the representation.7 Although the comment
3. See generally Harris Weinstein, Remarks at the Administrative Conference of the
United States' Colloquy on Ethical Obligations of Attorneys Representing Depository Institu-
tions (Mar. 21, 1991).
4. Id.
5. LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) § 1 at 3-4 (Dec. 19, 1990).
6. MODEL RuLEs OF PRosSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1990).
7. Id.
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to Rule 1.6 indicates that the lawyer must withdraw from the representation
if his or her services will be used to materially further the fraud,' Rule 1.6
clearly states that no disclosure is authorized.
III. ONE ViEw ExPRnssED BY THE CASE LAw: No DuTy TO DISCLOSE
An issue which Model Rule 1.6 does not answer is the question of
whether the law firm would be liable under the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws if it were simply to terminate representation, knowing
that the client will consummate the transaction anyhow and perpetrate a
fraud on the client. One answer to that question has been furnished by the
recent decision of the Fourth Circuit in Schatz v. Rosenberg.9 Schatz
involved a law firm which was a defendant in a private action under Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as other statutes.' 0
The action was brought by the seller of a company who claimed that the
buyer's financial statements on which he relied were fraudulent and that
the lawyers who prepared the documentation and attended the closing knew
of the fraud but failed to disclose it to, him, the intended victim."
The District Court granted the buyer's motion to dismiss on the ground
that because the complaint did not allege that the defendant law firm made
affirmative misstatements, the law firm owed no duty of disclosure except
to its client.' 2 Therefore, the court held that the law firm could not be
liable for a fraud against the seller, even though it continued to represent
the buyer with knowledge of the fraud. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding
that even if the law firm's conduct violated an ethical rule of the Maryland
state bar, such a violation did not create a legal duty of disclosure. 3
According to the Court of Appeals, the law firm simply "papered the
deal" and acted as a mere "scrivener" in putting into writing the terms to
which the parties agreed in preparing the closing documents. 4 When there
is no duty running from the alleged aider and abettor to the plaintiff, the
Court of Appeals held that in order to incur liability for aiding and abetting
a violation of the securities laws, the defendant must possess a "high
conscious intent" and a "conscious and specific motivation to aid the
8. "If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course
of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw .. " MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SION. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1990). The comment further states: "After withdrawal the
lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the clients' confidences, except as
otherwise provided in Rule 1.6." Id.
9. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
10. Defendants were also charged with aiding and abetting liability under the securities
laws and with common-law misrepresentation. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 488 (4th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
11. Id. at 489.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 492 (stating that "[a]n ethical duty of disclosure does not create a corresponding
legal duty under the federal securities laws").
14. Id. at 495.
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fraud.""s Therefore, despite the lawyers' actual knowledge of the fraud,
they could remain silent and participate in the closing of the transaction
without liability under either the federal securities laws or Maryland State
law.
The Fourth Circuit's characterization of the securities lawyer in a merger
transaction as a mere scrivener is generally not shared by other courts.
Most courts recognize that in complex financial frauds, the lawyer, however
innocent he or she may be, is an essential actor in the scheme. Thus,
lawyers have often been referred to as possessing the "passkey" to the
securities markets and their legal opinion as the "red or green light to
consummation of the transaction.' 6 As Judge Friendly stated in a Second
Circuit opinion: "In our complex society ... the lawyer's opinion can be
instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the
crowbar." 7
Nevertheless, although the facts as alleged in Schatz v. Rosenberg are
rather extreme, the Fourth Circuit's decision exonerating the lawyer is not
entirely unique. A number of courts have exhibited great deference to the
duty of confidentiality by holding that lawyers have no duty to disclose
their clients' frauds or crimes committed in connection with the represen-
tation. 8 Thus, one could conclude from these decisions that the law is clear:
a lawyer has no right to disclose client fraud or crime unless it involves
serious bodily injury, and lawyers are not liable for fraud under the federal
securities laws, or otherwise, if they fail to disclose their knowledge of a
client's fraud.
IV. ANOTHMR ViEw: THE "QUIT AND RAT" DOCTRINE
There is, however, another approach that imposes a duty of disclosure
which has been colorfully labeled as the "Quit and Rat Doctrine." This
doctrine was first articulated by the SEC in an enforcement action filed
against a company in SEC v. National Student Marketing.19 Other defen-
dants included the law firm that represented Student Marketing in connection
with" the merger transaction.20 The SEC alleged that Student Marketing, a
stock market high flyer of the 1970s, committed a fraud in consummating
a merger with another company on the basis of materially inaccurate
financial statements. 2' According to the SEC, the law firm partner in charge
15. Id. at 496; see also Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability Under the Securities Laws,
45 Sw. L.J. 711, 728 (1991).
16. Steinberg, supra note 1, at 1.
17. Id. (citing United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 953 (1964)).
18. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496-97 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that absent fiduciary relationship with third party, law firm had no duty to
disclose its client's financial stability).
19. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
20. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 686 (D.D.C. 1978).
21. Id. at 687.
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of the transaction for the acquiring company, as well as the lawyers for
the company being acquired, were advised prior to the closing of a clearly
material change in the financial statements. 22 The SEC contended that this
change required that shareholder approval of the transaction be resolicited.
23
Notwithstanding this knowledge, the SEC maintained, the lawyers proceeded
with the transaction and in so doing, committed a fraud on the shareholders
of the acquired company.24
According to the SEC's complaint, the lawyers had a duty to advise
their clients not to proceed with the closing and, failing to persuade them,
to resign from the representation and advise the SEC so that the public
investors could be protected2s-in other words, to quit and rat. However,
the Quit and Rat Doctrine was never tested in National Student Marketing.
Prior to trial, the law firm consented to an injunction without admitting
or denying the violation, and the court never had an opportunity to rule
upon the firm's obligations.
26
Since National Student Marketing, the SEC has not taken the position
that a lawyer who knows the client is committing a fraud affecting public
investors must disclose the fraud to the SEC. Most recently, however, the
Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision has suggested that lawyers
for federally insured thrift institutions may have a duty to disclose to the
insuring agency an impending violation of law which endangers the solvency
of such an insured institution. The Chief Counsel also suggests that if these
lawyers fail to do so, they may be responsible for any losses in the event
that the institution becomes insolvent. 27
V. THE NEED FOR CHANGES To PRoFEssIONAL REsPoNsiBIrry RuLEs
Notwithstanding the black letter finality of ABA Model Rule 1.6 and
its support by court decisions such as Schatz v. Rosenberg, there is contin-
uing debate within the legal profession over the disclosure duty of lawyers
when confronted with a client fraud involving the use of a lawyer's services.
This debate is particularly acute among members of the securities bar. Many
members of the Bar believe that the obligation of silence imposed by Model
Rule 1.6 undermines public confidence in the integrity of the legal profes-
sion. They argue that the public simply has difficulty understanding how,
in the name of legal ethics, a lawyer can remain silent, knowing that his
or her services are being used to harm innocent third parties.
Indeed, of the 38 jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Rules, 29
have modified Rule 1.6 to permit disclosure of client confidences in a
22. Id. at 691-92.
23. Id. at 700.
24. Id. at 712.
25. Id. at 700-01.
26. Id. at 687 n.2.
27. See Weinstein, supra note 3 (stating that lawyer should first "press the matter to
the institution's highest internal authority").
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broader set of circumstances than permitted by the Model Rule. 2 For
example, the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility permits a lawyer
to disregard the duty of confidentiality if it is "clearly established that the
client is using the lawyer to perpetuate a fraud or other crime." 29 Moreover,
in August, 1991, the Business Law Section of the ABA, in cooperation with
other ABA components, attempted to amend Rule 1.6 to permit disclosure
of client fraud where the lawyer's services have been used to perpetuate the
fraud and the lawyer belieyes it is necessary to rectify the consequences of
the fraud.
30
The proposed amendment was limited in scope. It gave a lawyer the
discretion, but not the obligation to disclose, and then only if the lawyer's
services were used in the fraud. 3' Its proponents argued vigorously that the
proposed amendment was necessary to protect both the legal profession and
the public. 32 They recognized the importance of encouraging free commu-
nications between lawyers and their clients by assuring clients that their
confidences will be preserved.33 They pointed out, however, that under the
proposed amendment, disclosure would be permitted only when the client
has misused the lawyer's services by not telling him everything, thereby
involving the innocent lawyer ii a crime. To protect confidentiality under
these circumstances, the proponents urged, would not encourage clients to
tell the lawyer everything, but instead would have the opposite effect of
rewarding misleading statements. 34
The proponents also pointed out that the present rule has a double
standard. It permits the lawyer to disclose client confidences when the
lawyer is suing for a fee or when he or she is being sued for alleged
misconduct in connection with the representation. 35 It therefore permits
disclosure of client confidences to prevent harm to the lawyer, but prohibits
disclosure to prevent harm to third parties arising from the use of the
28. Among those states whose confidentiality provisions differ substantially from the
Model Rules are: New Jersey, Arizona, Minnesota, Washington, North Carolina, Arkansas,
New Hampshire, Nevada, Connecticut, New Mexico, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Wyoming,
Mississippi, Wisconsin, North Dakota, Utah, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Kansas, Oklahoma,
Michigan, West Virginia, Texas, and South Carolina. LAws. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT, supra
note 5, at 11-41.
29. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESsIONAL RESPONsIBLITY DR 4-101(c)(1) (1992). The Virginia
Code of Professional Responsibility also states that "A lawyer may reveal ... [i]nformation
which clearly establishes that his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
upon a third party a fraud related to the subject matter of the representation." Id.
30. Letter from American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, Section Delegates,
to the Council and Officers of the Section of Business Law (July 25, 1991), reprinted in
Officers' Meeting Agenda Book, Annual Meeting, American Bar Association, Section of
Business Law, Atlanta, Ga. (Aug. 1-14, 1991).







lawyer's services. The inability to prevent or quickly rectify the harm from
client abuse of the lawyer's services both undermines confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession and unnecessarily exposes lawyers to civil
and criminal litigation on alleged complicity in the client's fraud.
Despite the strength of these arguments, the proposed amendment was
rejected in the House of Delegates. 6 The opponents of the amendment
refused to distinguish between street crimes and financial frauds. The
perpetuation of street crimes does not require the services of lawyers. In
contrast, the use of a lawyer's services to perpetuate a financial fraud is
often essential. In such situations, the lawyer is not a "mere scrivener,"
but brings to the transaction essential expertise in intricate matters of
corporate, securities and commercial law, as well as a professional reputation
often relied upon by the parties. For these reasons, there is a need to
distinguish between the ethical responsibility of the lawyers in dealing with
street crimes and financial frauds.
Indeed, securities and other business lawyers may well need a special
code of ethics that is tailored to their role in the consummation of financial
transactions. That need was recently recognized by Judge Stanley Sporkin,
the former chief enforcement officer of the SEC and now a federal district
judge in Washington, D.C. Judge Sporkin argues that securities lawyers
have a responsibility to prevent fraud and other crimes that goes beyond
their duty to clients, and that they should be governed by a set of ethical
principles that recognizes their dual responsibility to both their clients and
to the public. 37 Judge Sporkin's suggestion is beginning to receive very
serious discussion, both by the Securities Law Committee of the Federal
Bar Association and by the Section of Business Law of the ABA.
38
There is a broad consensus among securities and other business lawyers
for an ethical rule that permits a lawyer whose services have been used in
the commission of a fraud or crime to disclose client confidences to the
extent necessary to prevent or rectify the consequences of the misconduct.
Indeed, notwithstanding the existing provisions of Model Rule 1.6, many
lawyers will not tolerate a client who uses their legal services to inflict illegal
harm on third parties and will take whatever action necessary to prevent or
rectify the harm. It is their position that the lawyer's obligation of confi-
dentiality should not be used to require silence in the face of such abuse
of the lawyer's services. If the client objects, he or she may use another
law firm or press disciplinary, charges from his jail cell.
The more difficult question is whether disclosure to victims of a client
fraud or crime should be an obligation or simply a right of the lawyer, and
whether the lawyer who violates that obligation should be liable as an aider
36. Id.
37. See Harris Weinstein, Remarks before Southern Methodist University (September 13,
1990); Steinberg, supra note 1, at 26.
38. See Annual Meeting, American Bar Association, supra notes 31-36 and accompanying
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or abettor under the securities laws and other applicable statutes. There is
no doubt that any attempt to impose such liability on the legal profession
would be met with great opposition from most segments of the Bar.
The concern of the Bar over the creation of such an obligation with
intended liability for breach of the obligation is two-fold. First, even under
the present state of the law, lawyers increasingly are being sued for com-
plicity in a client's fraud or criminal conduct. 39 The charges usually are not
based on actual knowledge, but rather on allegations that the lawyer should
have known or was reckless in not knowing that its services were being
used in a client fraud.40 Prosecutors, judges and juries in such cases often
make their judgments on the basis of 20-20 hindsight and frequently assess
damages against the lawyer and other professionals simply because they
represent the only deep pocket available from which to compensate the
victims.
The second concern arises from the doctrine of joint and several liability.
Under this doctrine, lawyers and other professionals who are not the primary
participants in the fraud but who are charged with a violation of a duty of
care and are clearly secondary offenders are nevertheless jointly liable with
the primary wrongdoers for the full amount of the damage caused by the
fraud .4 The primary wrongdoers, however, are frequently in jail and, in
any event, are judgment proof; the lawyers and other professionals are the
deep pockets and frequently bear the full brunt of liability without regard
to relative fault.
Unless liability were limited by concepts of comparative fault and based
on actual knowledge of the fraud, the imposition of a legal obligation to
disclose client fraud and other crimes to third parties would too often result
in professional liability based on hindsight judgments of professional dere-
liction that were wholly disproportionate to the gravity of the conduct
involved. For this reason, one can expect that the legal profession would
strongly resist an ethical rule that imposed an obligation to disclose client
fraud or other crimes if such obligation carried with it liability under the
securities laws and other statutes.
The lack of consensus, however, on the issue of liability should not
obscure the need for revision of Model Rule 1.6 and state codes of
professional responsibility which inhibit the lawyer's right to take action to
disclose client fraud involving the use of legal services. In such instances,
the lawyer should be authorized to take appropriate action to prevent or
rectify the harm to third parties. It is time to bring ethical rules into line
with common sense, as well as with common standards of decency. It is
neither common sense nor decent to require that the lawyer remain silent
39. See Steinberg, supra note 15, at 728.
40. Id.
41. See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 700 (D.D.C. 1978)
(stating that SEC typically makes little effort to distinguish between principals and aiders and
abettors).
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while a client abuses his or her services to commit a fraud or other crime
upon innocent third parties.

